外文翻译--公司的股权结构、公司治理和资本结构决策——来自加纳的实证研究本科毕业论文(设计)文翻译外原文:Ownership structure, corporate governance and capital structuredecisions of firmsEmpirical evidence from Ghana1. IntroductionThe relevance of capital structure to firm value remains fairly established following the seminal article by Modigliani and Miller, 1958 (Grabowski and Mueller, 1972; McCabe, 1979; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Several theories including the pecking order theory, the free cash flow, the capital signaling, the trade-off, and market timing theories (windows of opportunities) and the fact that capital structure is voluntarily chosen by managers (Zwiebel, 1996) have been propounded to explain the choice of capital structure. Also, considerable research attention has been paid to the impact of agency costs on corporate financing since Jensen and Meckling (1976) published their paper.Crutchley and Hansen (1989) maintain that managers’ choice of stock ownershipin the firm, the firm’s mixture of outside debt and equity financing, and dividends aremeant to reduce the costs of agency conflicts. Bajaj et al. (1998) suggest that ownership is positively correlated with various measures of the debt-equity ratio (leverage), implying that ownership structure has a correlation with financial structure of firms (Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Mehran, 1992; Brailsford et al., 2002). Friend and Lang (1988) find that debt ratio is negatively related to managerial ownership. Brailsford et al. (2002) suggest that the relationship between managerial share ownership and leverage may in fact be inverted u-shaped.In addition, Berglo?f (1990) suggests that in countries in which firms are typically closely held, debt finance plays a more prominent role than in countries characterized by more dispersed ownership structures suggesting the impact of insider system of corporate governance on financing structure of firms. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) report empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the identity of large owners –family, bank, and institutional investors – has important implications for financialstructure. In particular, they show that a more risk averse or a more patient entrepreneur issues less debt and more equity. Given that insider system of corporate governance is practiced among listed companies in Ghana (Bokpin, 2008), this study seeks to document the impact of ownership structure on corporate financing, a mark departure from Abor (2007).Claessens et al. (2002) maintain that better corporate governance frameworks benefit firms through greater access to financing, lower cost of capital, better performance and more favourable treatment of all stakeholders. Corporate governance affects the development andfunctioning of capital markets and exerts a strong influence on resource allocation. Corporate governance correlates with the financing decisions and the capital structure of firms (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Litov, 2005; Abor, 2007). However, management incentives that include stock options introduces issues for the alignment of managerial and shareholder interests. The question is which way does managerial ownership affect capital structure decisions of firms? How does the form of governance affect the choice of financing? The empirical evidence observed in the literature is inconclusive with much focus on developed capital markets.Unlike Abor (2007), this present study considers a much broader corporate governance index of the impact of ownership structure, managerial share ownership and other corporate governance variables on capital structure decisions of firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE). Earlier studies on the GSE have failed to consider the impact of these factors on corporate financing decisions of firms (Aboagye, 1996; Boateng, 2004; Abor and Biekpe, 2005; Abor, 2007) implying that, these studies invariably ignores a gamut of other relevant variables that are central to understandingthe relationship among ownership structure, corporate governance,and firms’financing decisions from a developing country perspective Aside, the study uses more recent data from 2002 to 2007 whilst employing a panel data analysis. The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 considers the literature review; Section 3 discusses data used in the study and also details the model specifications used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 contains the discussion of the results and Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.2. Literature review2.1 Ownership structure and capital structureThe relationship between ownership and capital structures has attracted a considerable research attention over the last couple of decades. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined ownership structure in terms of capital contributions. Thus, the authors saw ownership structure to comprise of inside equity (managers), outside equity and debt, thus proposing an extension of the form of ownership structure beyond the debt-holder and equity-holder view. Zheka (2005) unlike the above authors constructs ownership structure using variables including proportion of foreign share ownership, managerial ownership percentage, largest institutional shareholder ownership, largest individual ownership, and government share ownership. Bajaj et al. (1998) suggest that ownership is positively correlated with various measures of the debt-equity ratio (leverage), implying that ownership structure has a correlation with financial structure of firms.Friend and Lang (1988) find that debt ratio is negatively related to managerial ownership. Brailsford et al. (2002) suggest that the relationship between managerial share ownership and leverage may in fact be inverted u-shaped. Thus, debt first increases with an increase in managerial share ownership; but beyond a critical level of managerial share ownership debt may fall because there could be only a few agency related benefits by increasing debt further as the interests of managers and owners get very strongly aligned. Pindado and de la Torre (2005) conclude that insider ownership does not affect debt when the interest of managers and owners are aligned. Jensen and Meckling (1976), in relating capital structure to the level ofcompensation for CEOs came out with the findings that there is a positive correlation between the two and this was supported by Leland and Pyle (1977) and Berger et al. (1997) who assert the claim that the correlation between CEO compensation and capital structure is a positive one. However, Friend and Lang (1988), Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) and Wen et al. (2002) found a negative correlation between CEO compensation and the financial leverage of firms.Morck et al. (1988) argue that family ownership may give rise to greater leverage than in the case of disperse ownership, because of the non-dilution of entrenchment effects. Mishra and McConaughy (1999) document empirical evidence that funding family-controlled firms use less debt than non-funding family controlled firms. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) report empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that theidentity of large owners – family, bank, and institutional investors –hasimportant implications for financial structure. In particular, they show that a more risk averse or a more patient entrepreneur issues less debt and more equity. Anderson and Reeb (2003) further argue that family ownership reduces the cost of debt financing.Berglo?f (1990) suggests that in countries in which firms aretypically closely held, debt finance plays a more prominent role than in countries characterized by more dispersed ownership structures. Bergeret al. (1997) found less leverage in firms with no major stakeholder. Lefort and Walker (2000) conclude that groups are effective in obtaining external finance and that there are no significant differences in the capital structure of groups of different sizes. Brailsford et al. (2002) suggest that firms with external block holders have low-debt ratios consistent with Friend and Lang (1988), who earlier on had indicatedthat firms with large non-managerial investors have significantly higher debt ratios than those without non-managerial investors. Cheng et al. (2005) also indicates that the leverage increases as ownership concentration increases following rights issuance. Driffield et al. (2005) argue that, higher ownership concentration is associated with higher leverage irrespective of whether a firm is family owned or not. Pindado and de la Torre (2005) suggest that there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and debt thus, all things being equal, ownership concentration encourages debt financing. However,they find the positive effect of ownership concentration on debt tobe smaller in cases of high free cash flow. They also find that ownership concentration does not moderate the relationship betweeninsider ownership and debt; in contrast, the relationship between ownership concentration and debt is affected by insider ownership. Thus, the debt increments promoted by outside owners are larger when managers are entrenched.2.2 Corporate governance and capital structureCorporate governance correlates with the financing decisions and the capital structure of firms (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Litov, 2005). Jensen (1986) postulates that large debt is associated with larger boards. Though Berger et al. (1997) concludes on a later date thatlarger board size is associated with low leverage; several other studies conducted in recent times have refuted this conclusion. Wen et al. (2002) posit that larger board size is associated with higher debt, either to improve the firm’s value or because the larger si ze prevents the board from reaching a consensus on decisions, indicating a weak corporate governance system. Anderson et al. (2004) further indicate that larger board size results in lower cost of debt, which serves as a motivationfor using more debt, and this has been confirmed by Abor (2007) who concludes that capital structure positively correlates with board size, among Ghanaian listed firms.In relation to the presence of external directors on the board, Wenet al. (2002) conclude that the presence of external directors on theboard leads to lower leverage, used by the firm, due to their superior control. However, Abor (2007) concludes that capital structurepositively correlates with Board composition among Ghanaian listed firms. And this is consistent with Jensen (1986) and Berger et al. (1997) who had earlier on concluded that firms with higher percentage of external directors utilize more debt as compared to equity.Berger et al. (1997) found less leverage in firms run by CEOs with long tenure and this was confirmed by Wen et al. (2002), who concludethat the tenure of CEO is negatively related to leverage, to reduce the pressures associate with leverage. Kayhan (2003) finds that entrenched managers achieve lower leverage through retaining moreprofits and issuing equity more opportunistically. Further, Litov (2005) supports this claim that entrenched managers adopt lower levelsof debt. Abor (2007) also asserts that entrenched CEOs employ lower debt in order to reduce the performance pressures associated with high-debt capital. However, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) refuted this fact by showing in their study that entrenched managers “enjoy the quiet life” by engaging in risk-reducing projects, indicating a positiverelationship between managerial entrenchment and leverage.Fosberg (2004) relates that firms with a two-tier leadershipstructure have high-debt/equity ratios. This was supported by Abor (2007), who concludes that capital structure positively correlates with CEO duality, which shows that firms on the GSE use more debt as the CEO duality increases.3. Research methodologyIn order to gain the maximum possible observations, pooled panel crossed-section regression data are used. Panel data analysis involves analysis with a spatial and temporal dimension and facilitates identification of effects that are simply not detectable in pure cross-section or pure time series studies. Thus, degrees of freedom are increased and collinearity among the explanatory variables is reduced and the efficiency of economic estimates is improved. The study is therefore based on the official data published by the cross-sectional firms for the various years covering a period from 2002 to 2007.Analytical frameworkThe general form of the panel regression model is stated as:'ititity=α+Xβ+μ i=1,…,N;t=1,…,Twhere subscript i and t represent the firm and time, respectively. In this case, i represents the cross-section dimension and t represents the time-series component. Y is the dependable variable which is a measure of capital structure. αis a scalar, βisitK *1 and Xit is the observation on K explanatory variables. We assume that theμfollow a one-way error component model:itiitμ=μ+νiwhereμ is time-invariant and accounts for any unobservableitindividual-specific effect that is not included in the regression model. The termνrepresents the remaining disturbance, and varies with the individual firms and time.Source: Godfred A. Bokpin and Anastacia C. Arko, 2009. “Ownership structure,corporate governance and capital structure decisions of firms Empirical evidence from Ghana” . Studies in Economics and Finance . Vol.26 No. 4.pp. 246-256.译文:公司的股权结构、公司治理和资本结构决策——来自加纳的实证研究一、引言继利亚和米勒1958年开创性的文章(格拉博夫斯基和米勒，1972年; 迈克，1979年;安德森和力波，2003年)之后，公司价值与资本结构相关性依然得到较大的认可。