当前位置:文档之家› 信息不对称,企业信息披露和资本市场:信息披露的实证文献回顾【外文翻译】

信息不对称,企业信息披露和资本市场:信息披露的实证文献回顾【外文翻译】

外文翻译原文I nf or ma t i on a s y mme t r y , c or por a t e di s c l os u r e , a nd t he c a p i t a l ma r k e t s:4 40A r e v i e w of t h e e mpi r i c a l d i s c l os ur e l i t e r a t u r e MaterialSource:Journal of Ac counting and Economi cs 31 (2001) 405–Author:Paul M.He a l y , Kr i s hna G. Pa l epuFinancial reporting and disclosure are potentially important means formanagementtocommunicatefirmperformanceandgovernancetooutsideinvestors.Weprovideaframewor k foranalyzingmanag ers’r eportinganddisclosuredecisionsin a capital Markets setting,and identify key research questions. We then reviewcurrentempiricalresearchon disclosure regulation, information intermediaries, andthedeterminantsandeconomicconsequencesofcorporatedisclosure.Our surveyconcludes that current research has generated a number of useful insights. Weidentify many fundamental questionsthatremain unanswered,andchanges in theeconomicenvironmentthatraisenew questionsforresearch.1IntroductionCorporate disclosure is critical for the functioning of an efficient capitalmarket.1Firms provide disclosurethrough regulated financial reports,includingthefinancial statements, footnotes, management discussion and analysis, and otherregulatory filings. In addition, some firms engage in voluntary communication,suchasmanagementforecasts, analys ts’pr esentations and conference calls, pressreleases, internet sites, and other corporate reports. Finally, there are disclosuresabout firms by information intermediaries, suchas financial analysts, industryexperts,andthefinancial press.Inthispaperwereview researchonfinancialreporting andvoluntarydisclosureofinformationbymanagement,summarizekeyresearchfindings,andidentifyareasf or future work. Section 2 examines the forces that give rise to demand fordisclosureinamoderncapital-marketeconomy,andtheinstitutionsthatincreasethecredibility of disclosures. We argue that demand for financial reporting anddisclosure arises from information asymmetry and agency conflicts betweenmanagersandoutsideinvestors. The credibility of management disclosures isenhanced by regulators, standard setters, auditors and other capital marketintermediaries.Weusethedisclosureframework to identify importantquestionsforresearch,andreview available empiricalevidence.Section 3 reviews the findings on the regulation of financial reporting anddisclosure.Muchofthis research documentsthat earnings, book values, and otherrequiredfinancialstatementinformationis‘‘‘valuerelevant’’’. However,fundamentalquestions about the demand for, and effectiveness of, financial reporting anddisclosureregulationintheeconomy remainunanswered.Researchon effectiveness of auditors and information intermediaries isdiscussedinSection4.Thereis evidence that financial analysts generate valuablenew information through their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations.However, there are systematic biases in financial analys ts’ou tputs, potentiallyarising from the conflicting incentives that they face. While theory suggests thatauditorsenhancethecredibilityoffinancialreports,empirical researchhas providedsurprisingly littleevidencetosubstantiateit.Section5 reviews the economic determinantsofmanag ers’fi nancial reportingand disclosure decisions. Researchusing the contracting perspective finds thataccounting decisionsareinfluenced by compensation andlending contracts, as wellas political cost considerations. Researchusing the capital market perspectivedocuments that voluntary disclosure decisions are related to capital markettransactions, corporate control contests, stock-based compensation, shareholderlitigation,andproprietarycosts.2TheroleofdisclosureincapitalmarketsInthissection,weexaminetheroleofdisclosureinmoderncapitalmarkets. Informationandincentiveproblemsimpedetheefficientallocationofresources inacapitalmarketeconomy.Disclosure and the institutions created to facilitatecredible disclosure between managers and investors play an important role inmitigatingthese problems. The framework for disclosure that we discuss in thissectionisthenusedtodevelopimplicationsforresearch.Acriticalchallengefor any economy is the optimal allocation of savings toinvestment opportunities. Thereare usually many new entrepreneurs and existingcompaniesthat wouldlike toattracthousehold savings, which aretypically widelydi str ibu te d, to fu nd their bu sine s s i d ea s. W hil e both sa v ers a nd e ntrepre neu rs w ouldliketodobusinesswith each other, matching savings to business investmentopportunitiesiscomplicated forat least two reasons.First,entrepreneurs typicallyhave better information than savers about the value of business investmentopportunitiesand incentives to overstate their value. Savers, therefore, face ’’whentheymakeinvestmensinbusinessventures. S an‘‘‘informationproblem’econd,oncesavershaveinvestedintheirbusinessventures,entrepreneurshaveanincentivetoexpropriatethe’’.‘‘a gency problem’irsavings,creatingan‘3Manager s’repor tingdecisio n sResearchonmana gers’r eportingdecisionshasfocusedontwoareas.Thefirst area,oftencalled positive accountingtheory, focuses onmanagem ent’s financial reportingchoices.Weprovideabriefreviewofthis literature; Fields etal. (2001)provide a more comprehensive survey ofrecentresearch in this area. The secondarea, the voluntary disclosure literature, focuses on management disclosuredecisions.3.1PositiveaccountingtheoryliteratureThepositiveaccountingtheoryliteraturefocuses on managem ent’s motivesformakingaccounting choices when marketsare semi-strong form efficient, there aresignificant costs in writing and enforcing contracts, and there are political costsarisingout ofthe regulatory process (seeWattsandZimmerman, 1978, 1986). Thecentralfocusofthisliteratureistoexaminethe role of contracting and politicalconsiderationsin explainingmanagementaccountingchoiceswhenthereareagencycostsandinformationasymmetry. Two types of contracts are examined, contractsbetween the firm and its creditors (debt contracts), and contracts betweenmanagementandshareholders(compensationcontracts).Politicalconsiderationsinclude manageme nt’s concernabout attractingexplicit orimplicittaxes, orregulatoryactions.Contractsarenottheonlymechanisms fordealingwithinformationasymmetrydiscussed in the positive accounting literature.Forexample, WattsandZimmerman(1983,1986)discusstheroleofreputationasamechanismforresolvinginformationpro blemsinthecontextofauditing.Empirical studies of positive accounting theory test whether managers makeaccountingmethodchangesoraccrualestimatesto reduce the costs of violatingbondcovenantswritten in terms of accounting numbers, to increase the value ofearnings-basedbonusesundercompensationcontracts,ortoreducethelikelihoodofimplicitorexplicittaxes.Findings indicatethatfirmsthatuseaccountingmethodstoaccelerateearningsaresmallandhaverelatively high leverage.Also,firms’a ccrualdecisionsappeartobeaffectedbycompensationcontracts.While a majority of positive accounting studies focus on analyzingpostcontracting opportunistic accounting choices, some studies view the choice ofaccountingand disclosure as partofthe contracting processitself. Holthausen andLeftwich(1983) , Watts and Zimmerman (1990), Smithan d Watts (1992), andSkinner (1993) argue that the use of accounting information in lending andcompensationcontractsshouldbeviewedasendogenous.Consequently,thenatureofafirm’s a ssetsanditsinvestmentopportunitysetsimult aneously determineitsoptimal contracting relations and its accounting method choices. Watts andZimmerman(1983)examinethe role of voluntary interim reporting as an ex antecontractingpartofcorporategovernance.Theex ante role of accounting in thecontracting process is also examined by Zimmer(1986), Christie andZimmerman(1994),andSkinner(1993).Although positive accounting theory studies generated several interestingempirical regularities regarding firm s’a ccounting decisions, there is ambiguityabouthowtointerpretthis evidence(seereviewsbyHolthausenandLeftwich,1983;WattsandZimmerman,1990).Forexample,sizeistypic allyviewedasaproxyforpolitical sensitivity, but is likely to proxy for many other factors. Also,as Palepu(1987),Healyand Palepu (1990), and DeAngelo et al. (1996) P.M. Healy, K.G.Palepu /Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (2001) 405–440 419 suggest,accounting decisions by managers of highly leveraged firms in financial distressmay in part reflect an attempt to conserve cash, or changes in investmentopportunities.3.2 Voluntary disclosureliteratureR esearchonvoluntarydisclosure focuses on the information role of financialreporting for capital markets (see Healy and Palepu, 1993, 1995). This researchsupplementsthepositiveaccountingliteraturebyfocusingonstock market motivesforaccountinganddisclosuredecisions.Disclosure studies assume that, even in an efficient capital market, managershave superior information to outside investors on their firm s’e xpectedfutureperformance.Ifauditingandaccountingregulationsworkperfectly,manag ers’accountingdecisionsan ddisclosurescommunicate changesintheir firm’s b usiness economics to outside investors.Alternatively, if accountingregulationand auditingare imperfect, a more likely possibility, managers trade off between makingaccountingdecisionsanddisclosurestocommunicatetheir superiorknowledgeoffirm’s p erformancetoinvestors,andtomanagereportedperformanceforcontractin g,politi cal or c orporate governance reasons.Management motives for makingvoluntary disclosure and their credibility are, therefore, interestingempiricalquestions.4.ConclusionCapitalmarketsare becoming increasingly global as a result ofa variety ofdevelopments. Institutional investors are looking to diversify by investing P.M.Healy, K.G.Palepu/Journal ofAccountingandEconomics31 (2001) 405–4 40 433around the globe; corporations are seeking capital wherever the terms are mostattractive;andinternet-basedtradingis making it easier forindividual investorstoinvest in international capital markets. Financial deregulation is encouraging theseactivities.The globalization of capital markets has been accompanied by calls forglobalizationoffinancial reporting.Thisraises several interestingquestions.First,isitoptimalto have a global accounting standardsettergiven wide disparities inthedevelopment of financial reporting infrastructure across counties? Second, whateconomic forces will determine the speed with which convergence of financialreportinginstitutionswilltakeplace?Third,whatarethe political and economicconsequencesofsuch a convergence? Fourth, in theabsence of convergence, willfinancialreportinginformativenessbeenhancedbyglobalaccountingstandards?Insummary,theincreasedpaceofentrepreneurshipand economic change hasprobablyincreasedthevalueofreliableinformationincapitalmarkets.However,thetraditional financial reporting model appears to do a poor job of capturing theeconomicimplicationsofmanyofthesechangesinatimelyway.Thereis,therefore,anopportunityforfuturedisclosureresearchtoexaminehowfinancialreportingand disclosures adapt to changes in business and capital market environments. Inaddition, as we note earlier, there are many areas where our understanding ofexistingdisclosureinstitutions and phenomena are limited. We believe that bothopportunities make the disclosure area an exciting area of study for accountingscholars.译文信息不对称,企业信息披露和资本市场:信息披露的实证文献回顾资料来源 : [ J ] . 会计和经济 4 0 5 - 4 4 0 3 1 ( 20 0 1)作者:Pa u l M. He a l y, Kr i s h na G. Pa l epu财务报告和信息披露是有潜在的外来投资者的重要手段,企业绩效管理,沟通和治理。

相关主题