本科毕业论文外文翻译外文译文题目（中文）：住房公积金的资金在中国住房发展中起到的作用学院: 文法与经济学院专业: 劳动与社会保障学号: 201006113002学生姓名: 李根林指导教师: 董登新日期: 二○一四年六月The role of the housing provident fund in financing affordablehousing development in ChinaRodney HowesPEF, 2 (3): 247–251, 2003.f 2003 Cambridge UniversityPress247DOI: 10.1017/S1474747203001343 Printed in the Hong KongPolytechnic University住房公积金的资金在中国住房发展中起到的作用罗德尼豪斯PEF，2（3）： 247–251，2003年 f 2003 剑桥大学出版社DOI： 10.1018/S9764747203001343 由香港理工大学出版摘要由于改革开放政策，中国的经济一直在快速增长，伴随着我国经济成就，在中国主要城市的住房问题上仍然一直都没有解决。
根据1949年以来的传统的计划经济，所有的住房生产是国家的责任。
由于缺乏资金，新建住房的生产一直没能跟上日益增加的城市人口。
在1988年推出了城市住房制度改革提出了通过私人住房市场发展经济适用住房为普通家庭的策略。
然而，这样一种战略的实施遇到了一些障碍，包括缺乏二手房市场的，未开发的房地产界，不明确的土地和财产的立法和缺乏适当的物业管理支持。
在一片这些障碍，缺乏住房金融似乎是在问题的核心。
为了生成用于住房发展资金，中国政府在上海于1991年推出了住房公积金（ HPF）计划，在这项政策里，要求所有员工和雇主向HPF计划贡献自己的工资的一定比例。
对于职工个人账户分别设立在中国建设银行。
今天的工人被允许提取其HPF积蓄，当他们退休时，或者他们可以使用自己的HPF积蓄购买房屋在私人楼宇市场，或从康居工程。
虽然在计划的运作有一些变化，但 HPF现在大部分城市在中国实施。
在上海通过使用HPF计划进行了实证研究，本文回顾了HPF在中国的融资保障性住房发展的作用。
关键词：住房公积金；住房融资；住房政策；上海；中国1．引言住房制度改革已经成为80年代中期中国城市整体经济改革的重要组成部分。
自1949年以来，中国作为一个社会主义国家，采取了福利分房制度，生产，分配和维修住房一直是相关单位的责任。
不像一个单纯的雇主，工作单位提供的福利的几乎所有方面，包括住房，医疗和教育。
这种情况下在80年代中期发生了变化时，住房制度改革在中国各大城市展开。
早在上世纪70年代末，中国决定在社会主义计划经济内通过促进市场机制选择经济改革。
经济改革进展顺利，并逐步扩大到其他非生产部门。
到了80年代中期，国有企业/单位开始摆脱他们的福利责任，并专注于生产活动。
这一发展的一个关键部分是具有改变住房提供就业福利相关的经济改革。
中国的工资仍然非常低，因为政府和工作单位提供大量补贴和社会福利给员工。
需要经济改革时，这些补贴和福利可能被逐步取消。
1998年，中国国务院总理朱镕基提出，住房市场将在中国经济改革中成为一个先行者部门。
随着工资结构的改革,人们会提供更好的薪酬,以换取照顾自己的住房需求。
在上海年人均实际收入在整个20世纪90年代有500％上升。
最高收入者会在同一时期上升700％。
人们的期望是，工人的收入水平普遍提高，政府帮助他们购买，而不是依赖于工作单位的员工宿舍自己的单位。
这些改革的结果改变了住房从一种社会福利到一个私人商品。
国家自1988年，向市场颁布了一系列旨在为提供住房责任的房改政策，通过出售国有企业拥有的住房单位的工作单位，各种计划得以进行实施。
然而，回答却没有如预期没有那么好。
关键的原因是因为承受能力的城市居民和商品住房.在公平性分配中的不匹配，住房单位仍然由国有企业进行，这让房改更多的分配给工人难以实施。
经过多年的零零碎碎的城市住房制度改革，中国政府通过了一项总的政策方向，城镇住房制度改革，需要的责任移交给国家到市场来房屋提供。
在1990年代后期的主要重点是转向到购房者提供财政援助的运作水平。
与先前在新加坡通过了住房公积金（ HPF ）计划相关联的原则，中国政府认为新加坡住房公积金这种政策适用于中国国情。
2．在中国城市中的HPF计划1991年初，上海市委市政府建立了自己的HPF计划，并随后推出了房改政策，1991年5月在房屋改革方案的提出五个关键政策措施：（一）实施HPF计划;（二）提高租金和工资补贴;（三）那些谁分配住房的人被要求购买住房债券;（四）承租人有折扣购买国有住房;（五）建立住房委员会。
HPF将被采纳为上海整体住房制度改革的核心组件，它提供了一个基本的和长期的手段，以满足工人的住房需求没有国家补贴。
根据上海公积金管理中心，要达成引入HPF的三个主要目标：（一）促进住房从福利到商品化的转化;（二）财务支持，以增加住房的生产，并满足居住条件差这些家庭的的住房需求;（三）建立住房制度，国家，单位和个人将联合起来，以供房屋发展提供资金。
上海是中国第一个实行将HPF作为金融工具的城市，住房制度改革，其中包括一种强制储蓄员工的一种形式。
它把在上海所有雇主和雇员按照要求按月到员工工资账户，在HPF贡献的员工的百分比。
最初的百分比定为5％，其后上升至7％，1999年，本计划的积蓄都存放在由上海住房公积金管理中心和使用基金仅限于提供贷款给企业，用于建屋指定银行;提供贷款直接向工人从私人房屋市场购买自己的房屋;并向企业或大型房屋维修工程的个别住户提供融资。
自1991年实施，HPF计划在上海已被普遍视为成功，它提供了一个榜样，其他城市很快效仿采用类似HPF方案。
在上海HPF计划延续到20世纪90年代迅速发展。
到2002年底，住房公积金计划在上海累计总金额为人民币57.773十亿。
在2002年，上海HPF累计人民币10.942十亿，比2001年高出17.7％。
3．HPF计划的管理在上海HPF计划旨在成为永久性的政策，因此至关重要的是，该基金计划的足够和适当的管理必须很到位，在HPF计划的管理和运作中遵循了三项准则：(1) 个人储蓄辅之以工作单位补贴;(2) 在一个单一的机构管理;(3) 仅用于指定的房屋用途。
该准则规定，无论是从国有企业和民营/合资企业雇主与雇员建立并有助于HPF。
预计非国有企业将迅速增加，当中国成为世界贸易组织（WTO）的成员，从而允许外国投资者在中国经营自己的企业。
因此，住房公积金政策将成为融资的住房生产和消费为国有和非国有工人的重要来源。
HPF的操作基本上有三个组成部分：（1）房屋委员会负责住宅在城市规划。
（2）公积金管理中心负责基金的运作和管理的机构，根据职责不同的方法会有所不同。
（3）指定专用银行资金是存放在由公积金管理中心选定一家银行中。
中国的人民银行负责对适用于HPF利率的决定，同时施工和财政部部负责监督该计划的战略和国家层面。
在地方一级，房屋委员会决定政策与管理中心和协会指定银行负责对HPF的日常运作。
在实践中，并非所有的省市遵循的上海模式，因此，它们制定了自己的管理实践。
一般而言但基本上在中国为HPF的管理采取了两种管理方法。
在第一种方法中，管理中心委托一家或多家银行收集并管理该基金。
房屋委员会将设立专门账户在选定银行将负责基金征收的基金管理中心的监督下的流动和跟踪。
房屋委员会有至高无上的权利，决定与计划有关的事宜。
在另一方面，银行负责办理存款，贷款和审计以及财务管理。
根据该计划每名雇员都与指定银行的特定HPF 存款账户。
这种做法在上海及其周边城市的江苏省获得通过。
中国建设银行是在上海的指定银行和上海公积金管理中心只负责监督银行的财务管理。
在第二种方法中，管理中心筹集资金，并提供管理和财务监督使用资金，包括单个记录的存储和检索。
管理中心也有责任确保HPF用于指定用途。
因此，银行只负责贷款发放给员工。
在较小的城市中，如温州、桂林已经采用了这种方法。
因此，可以看出，第一种方法需要银行参与这项计划，从而减轻政府的财政管理负担。
而且在实践中，管理中心必须保持基金记录的单位和个人，这将创建银行的工作重叠。
在第二种方法中，银行和中心之间的关系是相对简单的。
由于管理中心保留所有的记录，它具有直接管理和控制HPF的能力。
房屋事务委员会和管理中心之间的关系往往没有明确界定，在一些城市，该中心是房屋委员会或房改领导小组（房屋事务委员会在一些城市的一个不同的名称）的控制下。
在上海的管理中心是上海房屋委员会辖下，而在北京管理中心是北京市住房制度改革领导小组。
在一些城市中，管理中心成立房屋委员会的一个组成部分，它往往是含糊不清和混乱，尤其在关系和权力分配中。
AbstractSince the adoption of the open door policy, the economy of China has been growing ra-pidly. Along with economic achievement, housing problems in major cities in China have re-mained largely unsolved. Under the traditional planned economy since 1949, all housing pro-duction was the responsibility of the State. Due to the lack of finance, new housing production has not been able to keep up with the increasing urban population.Urban housing reform introduced in 1988 proposed a strategy of developing affordable housing for the ordinary households through the private housing market. However the imple-mentation of such a strategy has encountered a number of obstacles including the lack of a second hand housing market,an undeveloped real estate profession, unclear land and property legislation and an absence of proper property management support. Amid these obstacles, the lack of housing finance would appear to be at the core of the problem. In order to generate funding for housing development, the Chinese Government introduced the Housing Provident Fund (HPF) Scheme in Shanghai in 1991. Under the HPF, all employees were required to contribute a proportion of their salaries to HPF and employers contributed a similar amount. Accounts for individual workers were set up in the Construction Bank of China. Today work-ers are allowed to withdraw their HPF savings when they retire, alternatively they can use their HPF savings to purchase homes in the private housing market, or from the Comfortable Housing Projects. HPF is now implemented in most cities in China, although there are some variations in the operation of Scheme. By using an empirical study of the HPF Scheme in Shanghai, this paper reviews the role of the HPF in financing affordable housing development in China.Keywords: Housing provident fund; Housing finance; Housing policy; Shanghai;China1．IntroductionHousing reform has been a crucial component of the overall economic reforms in urban China from the mid-1980s. Since 1949, China as a socialist country, has adopted a welfare housing system where the production, allocation and maintenance of housing has been the responsibility of the relevant work unit . Unlike a mere employer, the work unit provided al-most all aspects of welfare including housing, medical care and education. This scenario has changed in the mid-1980s when housing reform was initiated in major Chinese cities. As early as the late 1970s,China decided to opt for economic reform by promoting market mechanisms within its socialist planned economy. The economic reform progressed well and gradually expanded to other no production sectors. By the mid-1980s, state enterprises/work units began to shed their welfare responsibilities and concentrate on production activities. A crucial part of this development was economic reform associated with the removal of housing provision as employment welfare.Wages in China remained very low because the government and work units provided heavy subsidies and social welfare to their employees. Economic reform required that these subsidies and welfare could be gradually abolished. In 1998, Zhu Rongji, Premier of the Chi-nese State Council, proposed that the housing market would be a pioneer sector in the Chinese economy. Along with the reform of wage structures, people would be provided with better pay in exchange for taking care of their own housing needs. As shown in Table 1, the annual ac-tual income per capita in Shanghai increased throughout the 1990s by 500%. The highest in-come group experienced a 700% increase during the same period. The expectation was that the general increase in the income level of workers would help them to purchase their own flats, instead of relying on the work units for staff quarters. The outcome of these reforms changed housing from a kind of social welfare to a private commodity.A series of housing reform policies aimed at transferring the responsibility for housing provision from the State to the market have been proposed since 1988. Various plans were implemented to sell housing units owned by the state enterprises work units to ‘tenants’. However, responses were not as good as expected. The critical reason for this was because of a mismatch between affordability to urban dwellers and the price level of the commodity housing. In addition, housing units were still being allocated to the workers by state-owned enterprises(SOEs), which made housing reform more difficult to implement. After years of piecemeal urban housing reform, the Chinese Government adopted a general policy direction for urban housing reform that required the transfer of responsibility for housing provision from the State to the market. The main focus in the late 1990s was a shift to the operation lev-el of providing financial assistance to the homebuyers. The principles associated with aHousing Provident Fund (HPF) Scheme previously adopted in Singapore, were considered by the Chinese Government and deemed to be applicable to China.2．The HPF Scheme in urban ChinaIn early 1991, the Shanghai municipal government established its own HPF Scheme and subsequently introduced its housing reform policy in May, 1991. There were five key policy measures under the housing reform program:(a) Implement the HPF Scheme;(b) Increase rents and replace by wage subsidies;(c) Those who were allocated housing were required to purchase housing bonds;(d) Tenants can purchase state-owned housing at discount rates; and(e) Establish housing committees.The HPF was adopted as the core component of the overall housing reform in Shanghai and it provided a fundamental and long term means to meet the housing needs of the workers without State subsidy. According to the Shanghai Provident Fund Management Centre, there were three main objectives of introducing the HPF:(a) Provision of an effective means to promote the transformation of housing from wel-fare to commodity;(b) Financial support to increase housing production and to meet the housing need of those families in poor living conditions; and(c) The establishment of a housing system under which the State, work units and indi-viduals would join together to provide finance for housing development.Shanghai was the first Chinese city to implement the HPF Scheme as a financial tool for housing reform that included a form of compulsory saving by employees . All employers and employees in Shanghai were required to contribute a percentage of the employees’ salaries on a monthly basis to the’ employees’ account’’ in th e HPF. Initially the percentage was set at 5% and subsequently increased to 7% in 1999. The savings under this Scheme were deposited in banks designated by the Shanghai Housing Provident Management Centre and the use of the fund was restricted to provide loans to enterprises for housing production; provision of loans directly to workers to purchase their own flats from the private housing market; and the pro-vision of finance to enterprises or individual households for major housing repair works.Since its implementation in 1991, the HPF Scheme has generally been regarded as suc-cessful in Shanghai, and it has provided a role model for other cities that soon followed suit by adopting similar HPF schemes. The HPF scheme in Shanghai continued to develop rapidly during the 1990s. By the end of 2002, the total amount of HPF accumulated in Shanghai was RMB 57.773 billion. During the year of 2002, the Shanghai HPF accumulated RMB 10.942billion, which was 17.7% higher than 2001.3．Management of the HPFThe Shanghai HPF Scheme is intended to be permanent and it is therefore essential that adequate and proper management of the Fund Scheme is in place. The management and oper-ation of the HPF Scheme followed three guidelines:1. Individual savings complemented by work unit subsidy;2. Administration under a single authority;3. Used for specified housing purposes only.The guidelines require that both the employers and the employees from SOEs and pri-vate/joint venture companies set up and contribute to the HPF. It is expected that the non-state owned enterprises will increase rapidly when China becomes a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) thus allowing foreign investors to run their own businesses in China. Hence the HPF will become an important source of finance for housing production and con-sumption for both the state-owned and non-state owned workers.There are basically three components in the operation of the HPF:1. Housing Committee The body responsible for the planning of residential housing in the city.2. Provident Fund Management Centre the body responsible for the operation and man-agement of the Fund. Responsibilities vary under different approaches.3. Designated BanksFunds are deposited in a bank selected by the Provident Fund Management Centre. The People’s Bank of China is responsible for the determination of interest rates applicable to HPF, while the Ministry of Construction and Ministry of Finance are responsible for overseeing the Scheme at strategic and national levels. At the local level, Housing Committees determine policies in association with Management Centers and designated banks are responsible for the daily operation of the HPF.In practice, not all cities and provinces followed the Shanghai model and as a conse-quence they developed their own management practices. In general there were basically two management approaches adopted in China for the management of the HPF. Under the first approach, the Management Centre commissioned one or more banks to collect and to manage the fund. The Housing Committee would set up special accounts in the selected bank(s) that would be responsible for fund collection and keeping track of the flow of the fund under the supervision of the Management Centre. The Housing Committee had the supreme right to de-cide matters related to the scheme. On the other hand, the banks were responsible for handling the deposits, lending and auditing as well as financial management. Every employee under the武汉科技大学本科毕业论文外文翻译scheme had a specific HPF deposit account with a designated bank. This approach was adopted in Shanghai and its neighboring cities in Jiangsu Province. The China Construction Bank is the designated bank in Shanghai and the Shanghai Provident Fund Management Cen-tre is only responsible for supervising the financial management of the bank.In the second approach, the Management Centre collects funds and provides manage-ment and financial supervision over the use of the fund, including the storage and retrieval of individual records. The Management Centers also had the responsibility to ensure that HPF was used for specified purposes. Hence banks were only responsible for issuing loans to em-ployees. Smaller cities like Wenzhou and Guilin had adopted this approach.It can therefore be seen that the first approach requires the banks to participate in the scheme, thereby reducing the financial management burden on the government. Moreover in practice the Management Centre is required to keep the fund records for work units and indi-viduals and this creates overlap with the work of the banks. In the second approach, the rela-tionship between the banks and the Centre was relatively simple. Since the Management Cen-tre kept all the records, it possessed the ability to directly manage and control HPF. The rela-tionship between the Housing Committee and the Management Centre was often not clearly defined and in some cities, the Centre was under the control of the Housing Committee or Housing Reform Leading Group (a different name of the Housing Committee in some cities). In Shanghai the Management Centre was under the Shanghai Housing Committee, whereas in Beijing the Management Centre was under the Beijing Housing Reform Leading Group. In some cities, the Management Centre formed an integral part of the Housing Authority, which was often ambiguous and confusing, especially with regard to relationships and the distribu-tion of power.5。