中文2715字外文翻译：家族企业战略管理：过去的研究和未来的挑战（节选）原文来源：CALIS外文期刊网译文正文：包含家庭成员在战略实施过程中,家族企业有选择使用家族或非家族成员的自由。
兰兹伯格(1983)建议给所有的亲戚提供学习的机会,但公司只能录用那些最有能力的人。
从战略管理的角度来看可以作为一个起点，但也应考虑家庭成员纳入或排除在政治方面的事务(麦克米兰和琼斯,1986)。
总的来说,研究发现家庭成员是比非家族成员有更多的产出(羅森布莱特,deMik、安德森、和约翰逊,1985分;基尔和基尔,1987)。
然而,在劳动补偿的问题上,罗森布莱特得出这样的结论:家庭成员相信他们更劳累,薪酬较低。
然而基尔确认为家庭成员能得到更高的工资和额外的补贴。
这一问题矛盾还值得进一步研究,因为如果不能意识到和处理好认知与现实之间的明显差异，可能会导致战略实施出现问题。
相反，在基于家的企业工作者的研究中，赫克和沃克(1993)发现家庭成员和无关的工作者比相关的工作者(即，表兄弟)有更好的绩效。
他们提醒说通过家庭关系而就业的亲戚可能是最不能干的。
虽然它提供了家业企业的一个聘用战略，这样研究还有待于在大家庭企业中去证实。
我们也知道否认亲属就业机会导致的后果。
因为招聘决定是一个公司人力资源决策中最重要的部分，为了公司的业绩，进一步研究这个问题，显然需要的。
从一个战略管理方面，对于家族中妇女的研究是另一个卓有成效的区域。
各种各样的研究报告认为妇女不适合被考虑成为家族企业的首席执行官。
其他研究员建议，女性成员作为家庭生活的看守者比男性成员对家业的有更好的效果。
对于妇女自己来说，就应该获得适当的企业技能、训练和经验。
如何最好地训练和部署家庭女性成员的商业、政治影响以及职业发展机会和对家族企业绩效的影响,在这些领域都值得关注。
代际问题虽然他们是密切的继承关系，但我们已列为战略实施的一部分，而不是因为他们对公司日常的日常运作的潜在影响战略制定的代际问题。
许多在这方面所做的研究一直是父亲和儿子之间的关系，明显是片面的。
研究人员报告说，创始人是一般的专制、不愿分享权力）和战略保守的。
另一方面，儿子一般不耐烦战略转变，个人独立性，并希望有机会证明自己的价值。
绝大多数的家族文献似乎认为，冲突是有害的，破坏性的。
这可能是真的。
然而，冲突也可以驱动改变的力量。
判决之前的研究，从战略管理的角度研究的程度和类型的冲突发生在双方家庭和商业情况。
更重要的是，这种研究可以探讨冲突影响战略的实施与企业绩效。
杜马（1989）得出结论认为，父子关系，不能一概而论，还要推广到父女关系。
她建议，父女关系更加和谐和性质不同。
女儿愿意承担起照顾父亲责任的作用。
因此，他们不太可能像儿子一样在与父亲的冲突中出现权力和控制的问题。
这是非常重要的，因为它提供了一个基础比较研究代际关系的基础。
在什么样的背景下考虑战略的实施？通过仔细匹配父子、父女情况类似的企业，研究可以回答这样的问题。
当一个领导者离开时，离开风格可能有所不同。
索南费尔德和斯彭斯（1989）确定了四个领导人的出发风格：君主，将军，省长和大使。
他们认为，一个家族企业的领导者最佳离开方式是大使风格，谁领导的组织中等水平的增长，认识到下台的时间，并保持与组织的顾问接触。
大使风格虽然可以出现概念优越，这并没有被经验证明。
无论是或不是，现有的文献提供了作为离境领导人如何可以说服遵循适当离境的风格，或继承人可以减少一个谁也不能这样说服领导的有害影响的一些线索。
兄弟姐妹的竞争弗里德曼（1991）认为，尽管竞争是针对于父母的爱和关注的竞争。
这是父母的反应，主要影响子女之间的相互关系。
建议解决不和谐的兄弟关系，包括鼓励开放沟通和讨论关于他们的对手，并让他们学会换位思考，并鼓励他们重新确定目前相互之间的关系。
从家族企业的观念出发，然而，我们并不知道是否或者何时，在家族业务中兄弟姐妹的竞争是不和谐的。
研究人员认为，什么是好的，家庭和谐是很好的业务，但这不一定是事实。
同时了解什么是良好的家庭是重要的，家族企业也需要了解权衡参与维持家庭和谐。
这是战略管理的角度来说。
例如，莱文森（1971）建议，如果孩子们提供的每个操作导致兄弟姐妹的竞争可以减弱。
这可能会或可能无法正常工作，因为每个操作的成功或失败取决于家庭是否和睦。
例如，如果位置是成功的关键，兄弟姐妹的竞争可以增加竞争的结果作为一个负责操作的最佳地点。
操作和控制决定一个家族企业的多元化，也影响了公司的盈利能力和竞争力。
研究表明，家族企业是不水平分化的，而且比非家族企业更依赖于非正式的控制。
因此，家族企业要更成功就需要一个精简和明确的结构。
大多数的研究主要是家族企业的组结构演变和变化，然而，与专业管理的转型有关。
霍兰德和埃曼通过制定进化模型找出了三种不同的方法。
第一种方法涉及公司的发展阶段和家族的代际传承。
第二个侧重于企业的需求和公司的关键个人的生命周期之间的相互作用。
第三种观点是企业、家庭和关键个人三者之间之间的相互作用。
在41家企业的实证研究中，霍兰和奥利弗找到由Ward提出的三阶段模型的支持。
在所有这些模型的基本主题是非家庭成员的责任和权力的委派在不同阶段的显著变化。
一个家族企业，因为经济的增长，在家族内缺乏管理技能，准备继承、或变更业务的规范和价值观，可能需要专业化和委托权威。
但是，业主经理人可能不愿因缺乏正规训练和管理技术知识不足以及昂贵的开销，害怕失去控制或认为专业化是不必要的。
从战略管理的其他研究角度和途径来看，可能会导致其他的问题。
例如，如果一些家族企业缺乏管理技能，希望能成功地转型到专业化的管理，他们应该尝试这样做吗？是否有其他的替代办法？如果有的话，是什么？此外，当业务需求和家族的欲望冲突时，公司的短期和长期业绩哪个更重要？综述正如上述讨论清楚地表明，家族企业的文化中描述了战略的实施以及家族对它的影响。
但是，不幸的是，它并不能显示出一个特定家庭因素是如何阻碍或者帮助企业实现其目标和宗旨的。
例如，我们不知道，是否家族企业与外部董事会成员能够做出与其他人不同的、更好的战略决策。
因为生命周期模型并不适用于每个企业。
我们需要了解，在影响家族企业发展的因素中，哪些对组织绩效的影响最大。
研究表明如果有性别差异，还需要直接知道，如果有性别差异，从商业的角度，如何采用有效的策略在事实上干预和改善兄弟之间的关系。
尽管在大多数文献的内容中，我们仍然对家族成员如何影响企业中的非家族成员，或者是否这些困扰是作为策略有效实施的促成因素还是是阻碍因素知之甚少。
记载的专制制度的创始人管理的家族企业的研究表明，如果他们还能向我们展示出专制制度在有效或失调时，这些家族企业和非家族企业的实际情况是否是不同的，那就能作出更重大的贡献。
总之，在我们知道在任何情况下，什么样的组织结构、系统和流程在家族企业中是最有效的之前，都需要做很多的工作。
原文正文：Strategic Management of the Family Business: Past Research and Future Challenges（节选）Pramodita Sharma, James J. Chrisman, Jess H. ChuaInclusion of family members.In implementing strategy, a family firm has the choice of using family or non-family members. Lansberg (1983) advises that all relatives be given opportunities to learn, but only the most competent should be taken into the firm. A strategic management perspective could take this as a starting point, but should also consider the political aspects of the inclusion or exclusion of family members in the business (MacMillan and Jones,1986).In general, research has found that family members are more productive than non-family members (Rosenblatt, deMik, Anderson, and Johnson, 1985; Kirchhoff and Kirchhoff, 1987). However, in examining compensation practices, Rosenblatt et al. conclude that family members believe they are overworked and underpaid, while Kirchhoff and Kirchhoff suggests that family members are given higher salaries and perquisites. This contradiction deserves more study, because if not recognized and dealt with, the apparent discrepancy between perceptions and reality can lead to problems in strategy implementation.By contrast, in a study of home-based business workers, Heck and Walker (1993) discover that family members and unrelated workers are more productive than related workers (e.g., cousins). They warn that relatives who depend on family ties for employment could be the least competent. Although it suggests a hiring strategy for family businesses, such research has yet to be replicated in larger family businesses. We also know little about the political ramifications of denying relatives employment opportunities. Since hiring decisions are among the most important human resource decisions a firm can make, further studies of this issue, in the context of a firm’s performance, are clearly needed.From a strategic management perspective, the study of women in family businesses is another fruitful area for research. Various studies report that women are not generally considered for the job of chief executive in family businesses (Hollander and Bukowitz, 1990; Salganicoff, 1990; Upton and Sexton, 1987). Other researchers suggest that female members’ positions as thecaretakers of family concerns can give them a better understanding of the family business than the male members have (Hollander and Bukowitz, 1990).Women, for their part, have been advised to acquire appropriate business skills,training, and experience (Salganicoff, 1990). How best to train and deploy female family members in the business, the political implications of their inclusion,exclusion, and career opportunities, and the impact of all this on the performance of family firm, are areas that deserve more attention.Intergenerational issues.Although they are closely akin to succession, we have classified intergenerational issues as part of strategy implementation rather than strategy formulation because of their potential impact on the day-to-day operations of the firm. Much of the research done in this area has been on relationships between fathers and sons, which Levinson (1971) observes is ambivalent at best.Researchers report that founders are generally authoritarian, unwilling to share power (Birley, 1986; Donckels and Frohlick, 1991; Geeraerts, 1984), and strategically conservative (Levinson, 1974). On the other hand, sons are generally impatient for strategic change, personal independence, and an opportunity to prove their worth (Seymour, 1993). Most of the familybusiness literature seems to assume that conflict is unhealthy and disruptive.This may be true. However, conflict can also be a driving force for change. Before passing judgment, research from a strategic management perspective could examine the extent and types of conflicts that occur in the context of both family and business situations. More importantly, such research could investigate the impact of conflicts on strategy implementation and firm performance.Dumas (1989) concludes that the father-son relationship cannot be generalized to the father-daughter dyad. She suggests that the father-daughter relationship is more harmonious and different in nature. Daughters willingly assume the role of caretakers, both of the father and the business. As a consequence, they are less likely than sons to be in conflict with their fathers over the issues of power and control. This insight is very important because it provides a basis for comparative research on intergenerational relationships. Is—or when is—conflict or accommodation preferable in the context of strategy implementation? By careful matching father-son and father-daughter situations in similar businesses, research may be able to answer such questions.When a leader does let go, departure styles may vary. Sonnenfeld and Spence (1989) identify four departure styles of leaders: monarchs, generals, governors, and ambassadors. They suggest that the best departure style for a family business leader is that of the ambassador, who leads the organization to moderate levels of growth, recognizes the time to step down, and maintains contact with the organization as advisor. While the ambassador style can appear to be conceptually superior, this has not been empirically proven. And whether it is or not, the existing literature provides few clues as to how a departing leader can be persuaded to follow the appropriate departure style, or how successors can minimize the deleterious effects of a leader who cannot beso persuaded.Sibling rivalry.Friedman (1991) argues that although competition for parental love and attention spurs sibling rivalry, it is the parents’ response that is the major influence on the children’s rel ationships with one another. Suggestions to resolve dysfunctional sibling relationships include encouraging open communication and discussions among the siblings about the roots of their rivalries, establishing empathy by inviting them to imagine their roles reversed,and encouraging them to redefine current relationships (Friedman, 1991; Lundberg, 1994). From the point of view of a family’s business, however, we do not know if or when sibling rivalry is dysfunctional for the family business. Researchers have assumed that what is good for family harmony is good for the business, but this is not necessarily the case. While understanding what is good for the family is important, family businesses also need to understand the trade-offs involved in maintaining family harmony. This is where the strategic management perspective comes in. For example, Levinson (1971) suggests that if children are each provided with an operation to lead, sibling rivalry can be abated. This may or may not work, because the success or failure of each operation depends on more than family harmony. For example, if location is the key to success, sibling rivalry can increase as a result of the competition to be in charge of the operations with the best locations. The fragmentation of operation and control or the diversification of a family businesscan also impact the firm’s profitability and competitiveness.Organizational structure, evolution, and change.Research suggests that the family business is less horizontally differentiated and more reliant on informal controls than non-family firms (Daily and Dollinger, 1992; Geeraerts,1984). As a result, the family firm can be more successful in businesses that require a lean and responsive structure (Harris, Martinez, and Ward, 1994).Mos t of the studies on the family firm’s organizational structure, evolution,and change, however, are concerned with the transition to professional management.Hollander and Elman (1988) identify three different approaches adopted by researchers to formul ate evolutionary models. The first approach relates the firm’s developmental stages to the family’s generational progression (e.g.,Barnes and Hershon, 1976). The second focuses on the interaction between the firm’s needs and the life stages of individuals crucial to the firm (Danco,1975; Davis and Tagiuri, 1989; McGivern, 1989). The third views the interaction of three sets of life cycles: firm, family, and key individuals (Ward, 1987).In an empirical study of 41 businesses, Holland and Oliver (1992) find support for the three-stage model proposed by Ward (1987). The underlying theme in all these models is that the delegation of responsibility and power to nonfamily members varies significantly in the different stages.A family business could need to professionalize and delegate authority because of growth, lack of management skills within the family, preparation for succession, or to change the norms and values of the business (Matthews,1984; Dyer, 1989). However, owner-managers could be reluctant to delegate control because of a lack of formal training, insufficient knowledge of management techniques (Dyer, 1989), fear of losing control (Perrigo, 1975), or a belief that professionalization is an unnecessary, expensive overhead. A strategic management perspective could lead to other questions and avenues for research. For example, if some family firms lack the skills or the will to successfully make the transition to professional management, should they even try to do so? Are there other alternatives, and if so, what are they? Also, when business needs and family desires conflict, which is more important for the short- and long-term performance of the firm?Summary.As the discussion above clearly illustrates, the family-business literature describes the influences of family on strategy implementation. Unfortunately,however, it stops short of showing how a particular family influence helps or hinders the firm’s achievement of its goals and objectives. For example, we do not know if family firms with outside board members actually make better—or even different—strategic decisions than those without them.Since experience has shown that life-cycle models do not apply to every business (Dhalla and Y uspeh, 1976), we need to understand the conditions that cause differe nces in family firms’ evolutionary patterns and which of these conditions has the greatest implications for organizational performance. Studies also need to be directed toward understanding from the perspective of the business how effective the intervention strategies suggested actually improve sibling relationships are, and if there are gender differences. Despite the behavioral orientation of much of the literature, we still know too little about how family dynamics impact non-family members of the business, or if these pressures act as contributors or constraints to the effective implementation of strategy. Studies that chroniclethe authoritarian system of the founder-managed family business could make a more significant contribution if they also showed us when the authoritarian system is effective or dysfunctional, and whether these instances differ for the family business and the non-family business. In sum, more work is required before we will know what kind of organization structures, systems, and processes are likely to be most effective for family businesses, and whether these differ according to the situation.。