Gender and Sexuality
Since the late 1980s, theories of Gender and Sexuality have redefined
how we think about culture and society. They have raised new questions
about the construction of the gendered and sexualized subject and put
forward radical new ideas about PERFORMANCE and PERFORMATIVITY as
the means by which the body becomes a SIGNIFYING SYSTEM within
SOCIAL FORMATIONS. At the foundation of most theories of Gender and
Sexuality is a thoroughgoing critique of the SUBJECT and SUBJECTIVITY.
As a social and political category, the subject cuts across all disciplinary
and theoretical boundaries. Being a subject can mean many things – a
citizen of a particular community, an AUTONOMOUS being in possession
of a sense of personal wholeness and unity, the subject of an oppressive
ruler or of a discourse. Being a subject and possessing subjectivity are
not the birthrights of all human beings, however; they are specialized
attributes, more or less unique to Western or Westernized cultures. This
notion of the modern subject begins in the Enlightenment, with the
reflections of John Locke, who regarded personal identity as unique,
sovereign, and autonomous. Subjectivity, the consciousness of one’s his-
torical and social agency, was the prerogative of the Western individual
who defined himself in opposition to the OTHER, to that which was not
a subject and did not possess subjectivity. The classic philosophical
expression of this relationship of the subject to what is not the subject is
Hegel’s dialectic of the master and slave. As is so often the case in
Enlightenment thought, the potential for subversion and AMBIVALENCE
is contained in what appears to be a universal concept. For Hegel’s dia-
lectic also suggests the possibility of the disenfranchised slave or non-
subject acquiring subjectivity by overpowering the master. By the end
of the nineteenth century, Friedrich Nietzsche could speak of the “subject
as multiplicity,” and by the 1920s, Freud would call into question most
of our preconceived notions about of selfhood and sexual identity.
Closely linked to the concept of the subject is the concept of IDENTITY,
which is typically used to cover the process by which a subject becomes
a particular kind of subject. Rather than a fixed quality or ESSENCE, iden-
tity is understood by theorists of Gender and Sexuality as an ongoing
process of construction, performance, appropriation, or mimicry. This
perspective, strongly influenced by Michel Foucault’s theories of sexual-
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ity, came be known as SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM, the idea that subjectiv-
ity and identity are not natural categories or essential features of human
existence, unique and indivisible aspects of one’s being; they are rather
the material effects of the discourses and images that surround us. The
crucial questions raised by theories of Gender and Sexuality have to do
with agency and determination: Who or what determines the construc-
tion of gender and sexuality? How is social AGENCY acquired and main-
tained by these constructions? Is one constructed solely by social
ideologies and institutions? Or do individuals have the freedom to
act reflexively, to engage in what Anthony Giddens calls “projects of
the self ”? For Foucault, sexuality has played a fundamental role in
developing modern modes of social organization and regulation. In his
landmark study, History of Sexuality (1976), Foucault argues that sexual-
ity, far from being proscribed or repressed in the nineteenth century,
became part of a discourse that sought to identify and regulate all forms
of sexual behavior. “Instead of a massive censorship,” he claimed, “what
was involved was a regulated and polymorphous incitement to dis-
course” (34). Religious confession, Psychoanalysis, sexology, literature
– all were instrumental in this incitement, which simultaneously made
sexuality a public matter and a target of social administration. “Under
the authority of a language that had been carefully expurgated so that
it was no longer directly named, sex was taken charge of, tracked
down as it were, by a discourse that aimed to allow it no obscurity, no
respite” (20).
Foucault’s critique of sexuality brilliantly exposed the ideological
mechanisms by which sexual identities are maintained and regulated by
institutional authorities. In this regard, his work paralleled that of Louis
Althusser whose theory of IDEOLOGY held that the subject is always
already “interpellated,” coercively recruited by ideological apparatuses
of the State. (On Althusser, see pp. 112–13.) Subjectivity, selfhood, and
citizenship are the products of socialization; agency, that quantum of
will that enables the subject to move within social spheres, is a product
of those very spheres. In another direction, Giddens argues that the
individual has many significant opportunities to intervene in the ideo-
logical construction of subjectivity; she is able to choose from an array
of available discursive strategies and write the narrative of herself. These
techniques of self-development guarantee freedom even in contexts of
overwhelming social power. In his later work, Foucault recognized that
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the individual possessed a necessary freedom from POWER, which is
“exercised only over free subjects . . . and only insofar as they are free.
By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a
field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions
and diverse comportments may be realized” (“Subject” 221).
Judith Butler is perhaps the most influential theorist to explore the
idea of sexual and gender identity as a social PERFORMANCE, a site of
power and discourse. “To what extent,” she asks, “do regulatory practices
of gender formation and division constitute identity, the internal coher-
ence of the subject, indeed, the self-identical status of the person?”
(Gender Trouble 16). As an alternative to such naturalized regulatory