Lesson 37
1. But jihadism is an especially centrifugal force, flinging adherents across borders until what we still notionally call al-Qaeda exists everywhere and nowhere, more an impulse than an organization. (Line2 Para. 1) — 但圣战主义是一种特别的离心力，它将其信徒撒布 各国，导致概念上所谓的基地组织无处不在，但又 无法寻觅踪迹，与其说它是一个组织，不如说是一 种驱动力。(centrifugal force: a force that appears to cause an object traveling around a center; impulse: a force or movement of energy that causes sth else to react)
One of the biggest challenges faced by the London agencies was how to communicate with the victims' families. Family members and friends found it difficult to get information on the status and location of injured or deceased loved ones — so the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) set up a family assistance center on the day following the bombings.
Lesson 37
Three Lessons from London
Background Information Additional Notes Photos & Diagrams Key to Questions
Structure Analysis
Lesson 37
The London Bombings and the Challenges In the deadliest act of terrorism in the United Kingdom since the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in which 270 people died, a series of four bomb explosions struck London's transport system during the morning rush hour on July 7, 2005. Three London Underground trains were hit almost simultaneously, and a London double-decker bus was hit nearly an hour later. Fifty-two people were killed and some 700 were injured in the attacks.
Lesson 37
The bombings came while the UK hosted the first full day of the 31st G8 summit at Gleneagles Hotel in Perthshire and a day after London was chosen to host the 2012 Summer Olympics. Two weeks later, on July 21, four more explosions took place, three in the Underground and one on a bus. The bombs only partially detonated and there were no fatalities.
Lesson 37
Failures in leadership can also contribute to coordinationrelated problems, especially when attacks occur in three different police jurisdictions, as was the case with the London bombings. Shortly after the attacks, the City of London Police, which is responsible for the Square Mile in the center of London, restricted cell phone network access to specific users to reduce network traffic and improve first responder access. This had the unintended consequence, however, of cutting off access for many responding agencies, including the London Ambulance Service. The London Ambulance Service was able to communicate using alternate means, and no major harm resulted from the restriction. Nonetheless, this example underscores the need for planning among agencies.
Lesson 37
2. Many are captured and killed; others resolve to sleep for a few years before striking. (Line9, Para. 1)— 许 多圣战战士被捕并被处决，其余的决定潜伏几年后 再进行恐怖袭击。(sleep: to be in the state of inactivity)
Lesson 37
6. If you make yourself a harder target, you push them to softer targets. (Line8, Para. 10)— 如果你采取措施使 自己成为更难以攻击的硬目标，那便会促使他们转 向更易攻击的软目标。(harder target: 硬目标，指政 府、机场和军事设施等防范严密的攻击目标;softer target: 软目标，指防范薄弱的公共场所)
Lesson 37
Responders also encountered problems with radio communications. Although the radio systems used by the British Transport Police and London Underground staff worked in the subway tunnels, the radios of other responding agencies, including MPS, did not. The interoperability of radios — the ability of radio systems to work in all settings and across all agencies — is technically a communications problem;
Lesson 37
Legal issues further complicated the multiagency response. Concerns over privacy laws initially kept authorities from sharing information with bombing survivors and their families. The United Kingdom's Data Protection Act prohibits sharing personal data without the consent of those concerned, thus limiting what information officials could give agencies and families on the identity and status of victims.
Lesson 37
Though at first it was thought that the explosion in the Underground was due to a power surge, it soon became clear that the explosions were an act of terrorism. The bombs in the trains were placed on the floor and detonated by timers. Following the explosions, the London Underground network was completely shut down, as were many roads near the affected stations. Mainline train services into many London stations terminated outside the city for most of the day, and the city's bus network was shut down in the central zone (Zone 1).