本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献标题:T hei n ternat i onal i za t ion oft heRMB,capit a lm a r ke tope nn es s,an dfi na ncia l reformsinC hi na作者: Aizenman,Joshua期刊: BOFIT DiscussionPapers卷: 4；期: 1；页: 4-26；年份:2015T hei n ternat i onaliz a ti ono f t heRMB,capi t almarke t openne s s,andfi n an c ialre f orm s inChina AbstractThis paper provides an overview of Chinese financial and trade integrationinrecentdecades,andthechallengesfacingChinainthecomingyears.Chinahadbee napr i meexampleof e xport-ledg row t h,benefi t in g fromle a r ni n g b y doing,andby adoptingforeignknow-how,supportedbyacomplexindustrialpolicy.Whiletheresultant growth has been spectacular, it comes with hidden but growing costs and distortions. The Chinese exported growth path has been challenged by its ownsuccess,and the Global Financial Crisis forced China toward rebalancing, which is a workinprogress.Refle c ti ng onth e int e r na ti on alizati onoft heCNY,one e xpect s t he rapid accelera ting of thecommercial internationalization of the CNY. In contrast, there areno clear-cut reasons to rush with the full CNY financial internationalization: The gains from CNY financial internationalization areoverrated.Keywords: export led growth, CNY internationalization,mercantilism,financialintegration,FDI.This paper overviews the Chinese financialand tradeintegration in recent decades. We start by evaluating the history of Chinese growth-cum-financialpolicies,arguingthattheexport-ledgrowthofChina was a highly successful policy, as hasbeenvividlyillustratedbytheunprecedentedcatchingupofChinesesizewiththeU.S.[either in current dollar or adjusted for PPP]. Yet, the remarkable success ofthisprocess sowed its end, and the need for China to rebalance its economy.Lookingforward,wepointoutthelogicofsequencing financial reforms. Whileone expects the rapid acceleration of commercial internationalization of the CNY, and thegrowing useofCNYinthesphereofChinesecommercialandoutwardFDItransactions,there are no c lear-c utrea s onstorus h witht h efullCNYint e rnat i onali z a t ion.Cha nc es a rethat the gains from a rapid CNY financial internationalization are overrated,and ignoringthedownsidesofthisprocesswouldbe toChinese (and probably global)peril.1The buoyant2000sChi na has been a primeexample of export-le d growth, benefi t ing from l ea r ningby doing, and by adopting foreign know-how, supported by a complexindustrial policy.Thispolicyhas beencharacterizedbycontrolledopenness,and internal financial repression. The financial repression has taxed the saving interestrate,allowing prime borrowers, including the Chinese state-owned enterprise(SOE),el a stic ac c ess t o c h eap a nd sus t ai n able funding. FDI has be en w e lcome, subjec tt o China'srulesofthegame.TheserulesleveragedthecarrotofChinesemarketsizeandchea plabor,inducingtheforeigninvestortooperateinChinainjointventure partnership with Chinese producers (Holmes et al. 2013). The outcome has beenrapidlearning by doing and transfer of know-how and the rapid climbof China onthela dde rof i ndus t ria l sophistic a ti on,chal l eng i ngfor e ignproduc e rsint he Chine s eand third-country markets down theroad.1Arguably, a modem version ofmercantilism has been at work (Aizenmanand Lee 2007, 2008). The rapid growth and the growing trade and currentaccountsurpluses as a fraction of the GDP has occurred in tandem with massive hoardingofinternational reserves (IR) combined with massive sterilization of expendingtrade surplusesandfinancialinflows.Thesepoliciesaimedatdelayingandslowingthere al appreciation associated with successful rapid growth. While the resultant growthhas beenspectacular,itcomeswithhidden,butgrowing,costsanddistortions.Figure1,inthe top panel, provides diamond chart snapshots of Chinese generalized trilemma configuration: Financial integration (leftward from the diamond's center),Monetaryindependence (vertically upwardfrom the diamond's center), Exchange rate stability(rightwardfromthediamond'scenter),andIR/GDP(verticallydownwardfromthe diamond's center). The first three scales are capturing Mundell's openeconomy trilemmaconfigurations,normalizedbetween0and1(Aizenman,Chinn,andIto2010).TheIR/GDP aim sa tcapturin g t heg row ing useofinte rna ti ona lr e se rve s t obuffer against financial instability. The chart exhibits the remarkable stability ofthe Chineseexchangerateduringthe1990sandthe2000s,bufferedbyrapidincreasesin IR/GDP, while maintaining controlled financial integration andmonetary independence.Figure1alsoputsChineseexperiencein thecontext oftheaverage exp e rience of e mergin g As i a [ excl u din g Chi na] and emerging Latin A me r i cadu ri ngthe same decades (the middle and the lower panel, respectively). The charts validate thegreaterfocusofChineseexperienceonexchangerate stabilityandIR hoarding,while overall maintaining limited financial integration relative to otheremergingmarkets.In t he r un-up t o the fina nc ial cris i s, t h e world e c onomy was c hara c terizedby enormouscurrent-accountimbalances(Figure2).China's surplus alone was0.7%ofworldGDPin2008,whiletheUnitedStateshadadeficitofmorethan1%ofworld GDP that year. The current account balances of the world's surplus countries(e.g.,China, Germany, Japan, oil exporters) exceeded 2.5% of global GDP in2008,co-fundin g the curre nt accoun tba lanc e s of t he world's de ficit co unt rie s, mostly t heUnited States, non-Asian emerging markets, and the Euro area excluding Germany.In the early 2000s, some suggested large imbalances could be sustained forthe foreseeable future. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003, 2005) argued anAsian periphery, primarily China, could pursue a development strategy ofexport-ledgrowth supported by undervalued exchange rates and capital controls for rgecurrentaccountsurplusesandofficialcapitaloutflowsintheformof accumulated reserve asset claims on the United States would characterize theAsian peripheryforperhapsadecadeormore.Moreover,thestrategywasa"win"forthecenter(e.g.,theUnitedStates)aswell,sincevirtuallyunlimiteddemandforits financialassetswouldallowitt orunlargecurrentaccountdeficits,livingbeyonditsmeans foryears.At some point, the Asian periphery would grow sufficiently to graduateto the center. It would then undertakefinancial liberalization and adoptgreater exchange-rate flexibility. But when that happened, another set of developing countries w oul d st e p fo rw ard t o b ecome th e new p e riph e ry, pursuin g the s ame e x port-l e dgrowth strategy against the center as had China and the Asian periphery, andbefore them,post-warEuropeandJapan.Asaresult,globalimbalances,withtheperiphery running large current-account surpluses and the center large current-accountdeficits,wouldbearegularfeatureoftheinternationalmonetarysystemforyears to come.D ool eye t al.(2005)pro vi deda n asse t ma r ket i nte rp ret a tion of the w in-winvie w ofglobalimbalances:U.S.deficitssuppliedinternationalcollateraltopoorercountrie s ontheperipheryeagertoundertakecapitalformation;thecollateralfreedthemfroma reliance on inefficient domestic financialmarkets.2The modem mercantilist view, embraced by Aizenmanand Lee (2007, 2008)andothe rs, provided a less s a ng ui ne i nt e r pret a tion for the persistent globa l im b alancesthat emergedinthe2000s.WhileAizenmanandLee(2007)confirmedthatthehoarding ofinternationalreservesthataccompaniedcurrent-accountsurpluseswasdominatedbya precautionary motive prior to 2001, a finding consistent with AizenmanandMarion's(2003) earlier interpretations, there appeared to be a regime changeafterward.A i z enm anand Lee (2008) poi nt ed to t he g rowingimport a nc e ofmone t ar ymercantilismasthemainreasonfortheregimechange. Accordingly, followingtheAsiancrisisof1997-8,whichmitigatedChinese competitiveness in the late 1990s,and the Chinese accession to the WTO in early 2000s, China intensified itsdrivetoward export-led growth. Like earlier mercantilist efforts to expand exportmarketsand accumulate gold described by Adam Smith (1776), after the year 2000,countries suchasChinastartedpushingexportstopromotegrowth,rackingupcurrent-account surpluses and growing stockpiles of internationalreserves. The numberswere impressive. On the eve of the financial crisis, China's real GDP growth had reachedabout 14% (Fig. 3), its current-account surplus had grown to 10% of GDP, and its international reserves had reached almost 45% of GDP prior to the crisis, peakingatabout 50% in 2010 (Fig. 3). However, unlikeDooley's et al. (2003, 2005)win-winviewofglobalimbalancesbufferedbyinternationalreservehoarding,Aizenmanand Lee (2008) noted that modemmercantilism could lead to unintendedadverse consequences,suchascompetitivehoarding.Thisconcernisinlinewiththefin dings ofCheungand Q i a n(2009)andA i z enm anetal.(2014)supporti ng re g i o nal r ivalryinhoardi ng internationalreserves.The view that large East-West global imbalances could be sustainedfor along period was not shared by everyone. Eichengreen(2007) and Feldstein (2008),for example,arguedtheAsianperipherywasnotmonolithic;somememberofthe periphe r y m ightabandonfix e dex c hang e ra t esag a instt he doll a rso one rt ha nla t er,either willingly or in response to speculative pressures, thereby reducingEast-West globalimbalances.ObstfeldandRogoff(2005) alsosawlargeimbalancesas unsustainable, and worried whether they would unwind gradually or abruptly.Alfaro,Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych(2011) observed that global imbalances wherepoorercountri e s fin a n c ed ric h e r ones we r e drive n ma inl y by government deci s i o ns a nd officialcapitalflows,sinceprivatefundstendedtomoveintheoppositedirection,attra ctedbyhighergrowthratesinpoorercountries. Theyraisedconcerns aboutthe global efficiency and sustainability of thesetrends.Aizenmanand Sun (2010) also raised doubts that large global imbalancescouldbe sustaina bl e. They argued that wit h C hi na growing a t tri pl e the r a t e of theUn i ted States,theU.S.current-accountdeficitsneededtoabsorbChina'ssurplusesincomingyears, intheabsenceofotherbigcountrieswillingtorunlargedeficits,wouldbe unrealistically high and hence self-limiting in the not-too-distantfuture.2The global financial crisis and China'sadjustmentThe global financial crisis of the late2000s put an abrupt end tothe happy-go-luckyattitudetoU.S.andChineseimbalances.Inthe U.S., the private sectorwasforcedtodeleverageandreduceditsdemandforimports.Othercrisis-hit developed countries also cut back on imports. As China experienced weaker exportdemand,ittookseriouslytheIMF's callformorerelianceondomestic spendingto sustain growth. It began promoting greater domesticconsumption andinvestmentwith the help of a domestic credit boom. It also pursued fiscal stimulus and alloweditsreal exchangeratetoappreciate(Fig.4).It attemptedtodiversify itsholdingsof dollar-denominated reserve assets by creating a sovereign wealth fundand encouraging outward foreign directinvestment.Sta nda rd macroeconomi c mode l s can acc ountfor th e reduc t ion i n globa l imbalances in the immediate aftermath of a financial crisis. Financial frictionsand householdde-leveragingreduceimportdemandaswellasaggregatedemandin crisis-hit countries, reducing their current-account deficits. If weak demandimpacts manycountries,therearefewtotakeuptheslack.Countrieswithlarge current-account s urpl uses, such as China, faced co l lapsing d em a nd for theirexpor t sand experienced declining current-account surpluses. Policies that stimulatedomestic demandtomakeupfortheexportshortfallcanreducecurrent-accountsurpluseseven more. In Aizenman, Jinjarak, and Marion (2013), we explore panel regressions asaway to highlight important correlationsbetween currentaccountbalances andec on omic vari a bles, both before a nd a f ter the financial crisi s. T he r es ults indicatea structuralchangepost-crisis.ThedeclineinChina'sreservestockpile post-crisis isshownto bedrivenbyanewwaveofoutwardforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)into developed economies as China seeks higher-yielding real foreign assets.Thesedevelopments suggest that China'ssmaller current-account surpluses andmoremo de r a terese r veaccumul a ti o nmaybecomea l onge r-term no rmasl o w e r g l ob al growthforcesChinatorelymoreondomesticdemandtoexpanditsecono my,andasthehighcostofholdinginternationalreservespushesChinatoplaceevenmore emphasis on outwardFDI.We assembled panel data on current-account balances and othereconomicvariables for a group of developed and developing countries over theperiod1980-2012.TheestimationdrawsontheempiricalframeworkinChinnandPrasad(2003) and Gruber and Kamin(2007). The specification also includes the U.S.demandvariable(measuredbytheU.S.current-accountdeficitasapercentofGDP)usedinAizenmanandJinjarak(2009)tocapturethe notionthattheU.S.actedasa"demander of last resort" for the exports of China and other countries, enabling themto run big current-account surpluses over part of the sampleperiod.The estimates confirm that astructural change has taken place post-crisis.After the onset of the financial crisis, the United States no longer plays such an important roleas"demanderoflastresort"fortheexportsofothercountries. Its privateand publi c se c torshav eh adtounder g osubstantialadj us t m ents,making t hemle s sable t oa bsorb the world's exports. The U.S. private sector has had to de-leverage in response tothenegativewealtheffectsofdecliningrealestateandportfoliovaluations.These privat e and public sector adjustments post-crisis have required the U.S. to retreatfrom its roleas "demander of last resort" for the world'sexports.P ri or t o the fina nc ia l cri s i s, the c ur rent accounts of sur pl usc ou ntr ie s a r epositively and significantly associated with the increase in international reserves,trade,andthein-creaseintheU.S.current-accountdeficit.Afterthefinancialcrisis,thefirst two correlations are insignificant and the correlation with U.S. demand reverses sign;it is now negative and significant. The role of the U.S. as a "demander of last resort"isdiffer e nt after2006.The GFC vividly illustrated the limits of the export-led growth; the Chineseexport-ledgrowthpathhasbeenchallengedbyitsownsuccess. The spectacular growth of China in the 2000s was unprecedented for a large economy-theU.S./Chinamarket size in current U.S. dollars dropped from 8 in 2000, to about 2 in 2010 [ Fig.5].TheEconomistproj e ct e din2014t ha tby2022,Chin a'ssiz e in c urrentU.S.dolla rswoulde xceedthatoftheU.S.AsChinaapproachesthe U.S.size,itsabilitytokeepexport-led growth was diminished substantially by the lackluster growth of the U.S and the Eurozone, inducing lower growth of China, and promoting it to embarkoninternalrebalancing.3Internal rebalancing: Challenges andopportunitiesWhile China's growth has been spectacular, it comes withhidden, but growing,costs and distortions. The GFC and the need to rebalance the growth strategy, andthe greater recognition of the demographic transitions facingleading countries in generalandChinainparticular,puttotheforeChina'sgreater exposure to tail risks. We review in this section several manifestations of theserisks.Chinese financial repression hasresulted in the taxing of privatesaving,transferringthemviathestatebankingsystemandother means to the SOE.Subsidizing the cost of SOE capital helped in facilitating fast Chinese growth inthe earlierdecadesofthetakeoff,yetitcomeswiththecostoftheSOE'soverinvestment bias,i nduc ing fa s t e rdi mi n ishingma r ginal produ ctivityo f theSOE,a ndre s ul t ingingrowing quasi-public contingentliabilities.The other side of financial repression has been the fragmentation offinancial intermediation,wheresmallprivatefirmsarenotservedadequatelybytheofficial ba nks,butbyshadowbanking.Thedrawbackisthatthesmall andmediumprivate secto r, which over t ime provides b r ig hte r future gr o wth pros pe cts t han th e SOE,fac es much higher real interest rates and greater rollover risks. The outcome hasbeen growingproductivitygapsinfavoroftheprivaterepressedfirms(Lardy(2008),Song et al.(2014)).AnothercostofChinesepoliciesmaybethecollateraldamageofmercantilism,th e rapi dr i s eof c os tlyhoardinginternat i onal r e s e r vesi n t i me s ofru nni ng l a rge currentaccountsurpluses,asreflectedinFig.3.AccordingtotheStateAdministrationofForei gnExchange(SAFE),China'sexternalfinancial assets at the end of 2013were about U.S. $6 trillion, of which international reserves were about 2/3 (U.S.$3.9trillion), the outbound direct investment (ODI) about 10%, securities investmentabout4%,a nd otherinv es t m ent a t a bout20%.T hecountry's e xt e rnalli a bility p ositio nwasU.S.$4trillion,outofwhichFDIinChinawas$2.35trillion,60%oftotalliability.Theinvestmentins ecuritiesandotheraspectstookup10%and30%,respectively.Therefore, China's net external financial assets in 2013 was about U.S. $2 trillion.3Yet, the real net return on these assets was, at best, close to zero, or evennegative.This reflects two fundamental factors. The first is the low real return onChinese internationalreserves(2/3ofitsgrossexternalassets),whichinturnreflectsboththe low nominal interest rate on internationalreserves and the real exchangerate appreciationofChina.ThesecondisthehighreturnontheinwardFDI,about60%ofC hineseexternalliabilities.ThelowreturnonChineseforeignassetsisbadnews,especially considering the rapid aging of China's population. This is in contrasttoJapan, where the sizable return on Japan's foreign asset position helps in buffering thefutureincome of its rapidly grayingpopulation.The policy stance of China during and after the GFC may mitigate down theroad thehiddencostsofChinesefinancialrepression.First,Chinaembarkedon dive rs i f yingit shol dingsof dol la rI Rbyc h anne l ings ur plus e sintoas ove reignwea l t hfund (SWF) and encouraging outward foreign direct investment in tangibleassets,offeringmuchhigherexpectedreturns.4TheoutcomehasbeengrowingFDIinthe r esource sectors and infrastructure services globally, especially inunderserviced developingcountriesandemergingmarketsinAfricaandLatinAmerica.Inaway,China joine d the trend o f other EMs, as de t ected in Aizenma n and Pasricha(2013),noting that EMs eased outflows of capital more in response to higher stockprice appreciation,higherappreciationpressuresin the exchange market, higher IR/GDP,and higher REERvolatility.The GFC and its aftermath also induced rapid Chinese internalbalancing,reduci n g t he sco pe of future hoarding. Sinc e the c risis, China's c urrent-a c c oun tsurplusfellfrom10%ofGDP(2007)to2.3%in2012,2%in2013.Thedropin2009alonewas thelargestrecordedinthelast30years.Thishashappenedintandemwith a drop in U.S deficits. The U.S. current-account deficit was about 6% of U.S. GDPin2006; it fell to 2.7% in 2009 and 2.8% in 2012. China's smallercurrent-accounts ur pluse s,amore m ode r a t eI R sta nc e,and a ll ow in gf asterrea la pp re ciation m ay becomea newnormal,aslowerglobalgrowthforcesChinatorelymoreondomesticdemand, while the high cost of holding IR and the secular rise in real wagesin China pushes China to place even more emphasis on outward FDI (Aizenman,Jinjarak,Marion2013).These developments are in line with Feenstraand Hong (2010), whoraised questions about the efficacy and sustainability ofexport-led growth in China as the way to increase future employment. They calculated that export growthoverthe periodoffastgrowthduring2000-2005couldexplaintheentireincrease inChina'semploymentoverthatperiod,butcomparableemploymentgainscouldhavebeen achiev ed by growing domesticdemand.Channeling IR intoforeign equity, SWF investment, and outward FDI supportedbytargetedloansandswaplinesmaybepartofChineserebalancing,aiming at securing a higher rate of return on its net foreign asset position. Arguably, it mayalso signaltheswitchfromexport-ledgrowthstrategytooutwardFDI(Ramasamyetal.2012) and e xport of infras t ructur e proje c ts a n d servi c es, possibly bu ndl ed w i t hexporting Chinese finance, Chinese labor services, and high-end capital goods.5This outward FDI drive has been part of amore comprehensive Chinese effect to promote the internationalization of the RMB (CNY), the focus of the nextsection.4The internationalization of theRMBOver t h e p as t fi ve y e ars, China h as stron g lyintensi f ied its eff or ts to internalizethe RMB. This agenda has been one of the main aspects of the country'seconomic policy,asexpressedinthe12thFive-YearPlan(2011-2015).Theplansupportsthe expansion of the cross-border use of RMB and the gradual realization ofcapitalaccount convertibility. The plan also supports the development of HK as amajoroffs hor e RMB market. T he internationaliz a ti on proc ess w a s put into e ffec t through severalchannels.Afterthefinancialcrisisin2008,Chinaembarkedonlargebilateral currency swap agreements with other countries, such asArgentina, Belarus, Iceland,New Zealand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and others (Table 1). This has beendonein tandem with the unprecedented provisions of swap lines among the OECDcount r ies, and t he more s elect i ve provi s ion of four s w ap l ine s by t he U.S. FEDt oselected emerging markets (Table1).Comparing the bilateral swap lines offered bythe U.S. FED andthe PBOC reveals key differences. Most of the swap lines offered by China have beentodeveloping and emerging market countries, whereas most of the bilateral swaplinesoffered by the U.S. FED and the ECB are between the OECD countries, andfour emerging markets:Brazil, SouthKorea, Mexico, andSingapore. Aizenmanand Pasticha(2010)pointedoutthattheselectioncriteriaexplainingtheU.S.FEDsu pply ofbilateralswaplinestoemergingmarketswereclosefinancialandtradeties,ahighdegree of financial openness, and a relatively good sovereign credit history. Chances arethatsimilarfactorsaccountforChinesesupplyofRMBbilateralswaplinestoagrow ing listof developing and emerging markets, as has been vividly illustratedby。